CO129-331 - Public Offices - 1905 — Page 399

(Confidential.)

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Inclosure 31 in No. 1.

Mr. Colvin to Government of India.

I HAVE the honour to reply to Mr. Clarke's Confidential letter, dated the

Srinagar, October 12, 1904. 18th August, 1904, regarding the frontier between Hunza and the Chinese dominions and the disputed rights of the Kanjutis in Raskam.

2. As regards the rights which have recently been exercised by the Kanjutis in the western extremity of the Taghdumbash Pamir, I may say that the only right exercised by the Mir of Hunza in that tract of late years is that of levying tribute from the Sarikolis and Kirghiz, who resort to that locality for grazing purposes. been acknowledged by the Chinese, and the Mir's Representative was on the Pamir only This right has last month for the purpose of collecting the tribute due for the current year.

3. As to the measures which it would be practicable to adopt for effectively asserting the rights of the Mir of Hunza in this tract, in the event of China acting inconsistently with such rights, I am of opinion that, as against China, this could be done by establishing levy posts at convenient points near the proposed border, probably at Mintaka Aghazi and Kuktarak. This would suffice for securing the observance by China of the proposed frontier.

4. It is, I think, my duty to add that I am not in favour of any such measure, On further consideration of the whole proposal, it seems more consistent to withdraw from all positions where the claims of our frontier States can possibly involve the Government of India in complications with Russia. The whole tenour of the despatch of the Government of India dated the 24th March, 1904, indicates that this is the policy which they desire to follow. The western portion of the Taghdambash Pamir is such a position, just as much as Raskam. We could hold it by levy posts against China, but, if and when Russia has taken the whole of Chinese Turkestan, our position strategically on the line between Peak Pavolo Schreikovsky and the Karchanai Pass would be quite untenable. If China had not agreed to this frontier, Russia would certainly disregard it, and either a complication would arise, such as it is our desire to guard against, or we should have to ignominiously withdraw, on the mere suggestion of hostilities, from positions which, during peace time, we had only been able to maintain at great expense and inconvenience, for there is no doubt that the cost of supplying and maintaining these posts would be great, as there is no surplus grain in Hunza, and supplies would have to be carried from Gilgit.

5. Captain McMahon in 1898 pointed out the inconveniences which might result from surrendering territory beyond the natural strategic frontier of the Hindoo Kush and Mustagh ranges; but it has been decided (as, I think, very rightly) that the balance of considerations is in favour of such surrender, the territory not being very valuable and being likely to supply an inconvenient handle to the enemy. the western portion of the Taghduabash Pamir not less than to Raskam, only I think The argument applies to that, to make the complete separation of Hunza from China and the loss of its rights in these territories more palatable to the former, the Government of India should not hesitate to award liberal compensation to the Mir, not less certainly than 6,000 rupees a-year. It is of the first importance that in the event of trouble with Russia on this border, or if she should make a feint towards Hunza, the people of that country should be ready and willing to co-operate with us in the warding off of an attack; and to secure their loyalty and gratitude, the grant of 6,000 rupees per annum towards the Mir's revenues and the provision of suitable employment for the people are absolutely insignificant items in the scale,

6. I therefore recommend that the proposed frontier should be modified in the following manner: From Peak Pavolo Schveikovsky the line would follow the northern watershed of the Taghdumbash Panir, passing through the Taghra Maum. Mehman- yoli, and Kara-jilga Passes, thence, still following the watershed, round the western extremity of the Taghdumbash Pamir to the Wakhajrui Pass; thence to the Kilik Pass, which becomes a tri-junction, and thence round the southern watershed of the Taghdumbash to the Mintaka, and so to the Karchanai Pass, where it would rejoin the frontier that has been already proposed. The places mentioned above

are all clearly marked in sheets No. 2-N.E. and No. 2-S.E. of the Trans-frontier Survey Maps.

7. As regards Darwaza, I see no advantage in the proposed deflection from the natural border, in order to include this place within our frontier. On this point Major Gurdon writes as follows:-

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"I see from Sir W. Cuningham's Confidential demi-official letter, dated the 1st August, 1898, to Sir A. Talbot that Younghusband advocated the retention of the Hunza (or Kanjuti) post at Darwaza, just on the other side of the Shimshal Pass. I fail to see any advantage in retaining Darwaza. I fancy the Hunza people held it in the old days as a connecting link between the Shimshal Valley and Raskam aud Oprang, and with a view to securing the retreat of their raiding parties. I think the frontier should adhere to the crest of the Mustagh Range. The actual pass, which is called Shimshal, may be easy, but the valley which leads to it (I mean on the Hunza side), e.g., the Shimshal Valley, is the most difficult in the whole of the Hindoo Kush region. So far as I know, Younghusband did not explore the Shimshal Valley on the Hunza side, but Cockerill did, and you will find his report in your office. The Shimshal Valley is so difficult that every one hesitates to go there, and the present Mir of Hunza is visiting it this summer for the first time in his life. There is certainly no cause for anxiety in this direction,”

I concur in Major Gurdon's views.

8. If the boundary sketched above is substituted for that which has already been proposed, it will follow throughout its length a line which forms a natural strategic frontier, which is perfectly clear and which would not require demarcation in situ, while it seems not improbable that the modifications proposed would make the acceptance of the frontier quite palatable to the Chinese. It would undoubtedly be better to have this boundary defined with their consent, or at least with their deliberate acquiescence; but if the necessity of such definition compels us to impose a frontier on China, then it is equally clear that the frontier selected should be that which is most casily and naturally defensible--in other words, the main ranges of the Hindoo Kush and Mustagb.

9. I have not received any reply from Mr. Macartney to my letter to him on this subject; but as the Government of India have pressed for an early reply, I submit these views, and will, if it seems necessary, forward Mr. Macartney's opinion on arrival. Major Gurdon's opinion and mine are entirely in accord on all the points raised.

(Telegraphic.)

Inclosure 32 in No. 1.

Government of India to Mr. Colvin.

Simla, November 7, 1904.

Please expedite reply

YOUR letter of the 12th October, 1904. Hunza frontier. Does the Mir maintain any post now at Darwaza ?

to my telegram of the 8th October, asking you to forward Amban's letter to Mir of Hunza.

Addressed Resident, Kashmir; repeated to Political Agent, Gilgit.

Inclosure 33 in No. 1.

Mr. Colvin to Government of India.

Srinagar, November 12, 1904. IN continuation of my letter, dated the 12th October, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter, dated the 2nd October, 1904, from His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Kashgar regarding the frontier between Kashmir and the New Dominion.

2. Mr. Macartney's views are very interesting. It will be seen that he is of opinion that the Chinese would at once resort to force if the Mir of Hunza were to establish an outpost in the Western Taghdumbash. Without sharing that opinion, I think, as I have already written, that it is not desirable to attempt to hold this country on behalf of the Mir.

3. The suggestion that we should make the cession of all territorial rights in this tract by the Mir the peg on which to hang a condition that China should not cede it to a third Power, or allow any other Power to station troops there without the consent of the British Government, is a useful one, and would be no doubt effective so long as Kashgaria remains under Chinese sovereignty, but no longer,

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